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1 
The margin of appreciation doctrine: a low-level institutional view 
 
The article argues that the margin of appreciation (MoA) doctrine of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR or Court), should be understood as, inter alia, an underenforcement 
doctrine, according to which Convention rights should not be applied to their full conceptual 
Ǥ          ǯ
role and competence. Although institutional considerations have been theorised normatively, 
    Ǯ-ǯ      
competence of different decision-makers across the Council of Europe is critical in explaining 
MoA. Such comparative empirical analysis ties shared institutional responsibility and 
subsidiarity with certain traits of decision-makers when determining Convention rights. In 
this context, the article briefly compares the decision-making abilities of different institutions. 
It concludes by stressing that under certain circumstances the Court can be worse placed than 
national authorities to decide on violations of Convention rights. This is corroborated by the 
ǯ 
of States Parties. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The margin of appreciation doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights continues 
to steer disagreement when it comes to interpreting the European Convention of Human 
Rights (Convention or ECHR). Widely used by the Court to identify the duties that stem 
from the Convention,1,the doctrine gives States Parties leeway in the identification of the 
content of Convention rights. MoA is thus commonly understood as an exercise of self-
restraint on the part of the Court, since it implies applying doctrinal tests that fall short of 
                                                                    
1 See, eg Lautsi and Others v Italy  ? ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ?ȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌǤ	ǯ
MoA in Lautsi see D Kyritsis & S Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?ǯ L 217. 
2 ǮǯǤ2 By invoking MoA, the Court appears 
to underenforce Convention rights.3 It typically lowers the intensity of its review, accepts ǯ    , ritualistically states    Ǯ better     ǯ      of cases4 and ultimately declines to 
draw on an optimal understanding of Convention rights.5 
Various critics think that this underenforcement aspect of MoA is deeply problematic.6 
They argue that the Court is vested with the responsibility, formulated in Article 32 (1) of 
the Convention, to interpret and apply the Convention and its Protocols following the 
lodging of individual applications, in order to ensure observance by the States Parties and 
protect human rights.7 It is generally accepted, not least by the Court itself, that this 
responsibility requires determining whether a violation of the Convention took place 
independently of the arguments and views held by the respondent states.8 Hence, critics 
                                                                    
2 See L Sager Ǯ	 ǣ       ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ? ?Harv L R 
1212 at 1213. 
3 ǮǯǢL Sager above 
n 2 at 1212. 
4 The birthplace of this typical dictum is the case of Ireland v UK (18 January 1978), Series A no 25 at para 207. ǮǯǤ 
5 	ǯǡLf Turkey (10 November 2005), App no 
44774/98 ECHR 2005-XI; Wingrove v UK (25 November 1996), ECHR 1996-V; Evans v UK (10 April 2007), 
App no 6339/05 ECHR 2007-IV; Vo v France (8 July 2004), App no 53924/00, ECHR 2004-VIII. 
6 See eg J A Brauch Ǯ           of Human ǣǯȋ ? ? ? ?-5) 11 Colum J Eur L 113. 
7 See eg the partly dissenting opinion of Judge De Meyer in Z v Finland (1997) 25  ? ? ?ǣ ǮǯǲǳǤ
time for the Court to banish the concept from its reasoning. It has already delayed too long in abandoning this     Ǥǥ  ǡ  o Ǥǯ  
8 On this point see ǯ-Ǯǯǡ
Engel and Others v Netherlands (1976) Series A no 22. 	     Ǯ ǯ
method see G ǡǮǣǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?ǯ 
279. 
3 
claim, insofar as it entails a suboptimal reading of ECHR rights, MoA is either an abdication ǯǡǤ9  
A standard way of resisting these criticisms is by distinguishing between substantive 
and institutional considerations in the determination of a workable scheme of 
internationally justiciable Convention rights.10 Institutional considerations apply to the 
Court by virtue of its particular institutional role in a shared scheme of supranational 
human rights governance.11 Institutional views insist, first, that the ECtHR is a court and, 
second, that it is an international court. The first feature entails that the Court implements 
the Convention by cooperating with political institutions other than courts, such as national 
legislatures. This points to concerns about the legitimacy of unelected judges reviewing 
decisions taken by democratic institutions12, traditionally tackled by means of a theory of 
separation of powers.13 The second feature necessitates balancing the sovereignty of states 
with a supranational system of decision-making14, usually addressed by taking on a 
normative conception of subsidiarity.15 Overall, MoA would result from the need to balance 
                                                                    
9 See eg the opinion of Judge De Meyer above n 7; E ǡ Ǯ f Appreciation, Consensus, and ǯȋ ? ? ? ?-99) 31 ǯ 843. 
10 On institutional considerations and their role in judicial decision-making see eg J ǡ Ǯ   ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ? ?Oxf J L S 409; A ǡ Ǯ     ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?U Tor L J 23 at 27; D Kyritsis Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
32 Oxf J L S 297. 
11 See eg S Greer The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006) p 216; A von Staden Ǯ    ǣ       ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ? ? ǯ   
1023; A Legg The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and Proportionality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013). 
12 D Kyritsis above n 10 at 300. 
13 D Kyritsis above n 10; J Waldron Ǯǫǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?B U L Rev 433. 
14 See L Helfer and A-M Slaughter Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ?Yale 
L J 273 at 316Ȃ317. 
15 A von Staden above n 11; A 	Þǡ Ǯ ǣ ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ?J Pol Phil 190; P Carozza, Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?ǯ 38. 
4 
both state sovereignty and the legitimacy of domestic democratic institutions against the 
authority of unelected international judges.16 
In this article, I add a new strand to this institutional reading. The evolving 
institutionalist literature on the ECtHR has so faǮ-ǯ
theories.17 High-level theorizing predominantly unpacks the concept of subsidiarity in 
judicial review contexts and traces its normative implications18 by resorting to democratic 
theory and to abstract conceptions of supranational constitutionalism and human rights.19 
While recognizing the importance of this kind of high-level normative analysis, I propose to 
supplement it with a substantially different approach. Taking my cue from the work of 
institutionalists such as Neil Komesar20 and Adrian Vermeule,21    Ǯ-ǯ
empirical inquiry into the comparative institutional competence of different decision-
makers across the Council of Europe is crucial in explaining and justifying MoA. My 
ultimate aim is to defend the normative relevance of an empirical research agenda 
alongside abstract high-level conceptual theorizing. 
The article unfolds as follows. In section 2, I discuss the underenforcement features of 
MoA, which point towards the normative relevance of institutional concerns ǯ
decision-making process. Then, in section 3 I defend the view that institutional concerns 
                                                                    
16 Y ǡ Ǯ
ǫǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ǯ 
907; A von Staden above n 11; A von Bogdandy and I ǡ Ǯ  ǫ   ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?ǯ 1. 
17 A von Staden above n 11; A von Bogdandy and I Venzke above n 16; A 	Þǡ Ǯ  
International Human Rights Review: The Case of the ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ 40 J Soc Phil 
595. 
18 A von Staden above n 11; M ǡǮǣionalist Framework of ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ 15 ǯ 907. 
19 A von Staden above n 11; A von Bogdandy and I Venzke above n 16; M Kumm above n 18. 
20 N Komesar Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 1994). 
21 A Vermeule Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 2006). 
5 
also comprise comparative institutional abilities that can only be identified through 
concrete empirical research. More specifically, I argue in favour of a normative account that 
ties shared institutional responsibility and subsidiarity with the empirical features of a 
variety of decision-makers in the determination of the content of Convention rights. My 
central claim, which connects high-level normative with low-level empirical considerations, 
is that the Convention scheme of human rights governance is a scheme of cooperation that 
attributes to a wide variety of institutional agents, and first and foremost to national 
authorities, the shared responsibility of effectively implementing the ECHR. Under conditions 
of uncertainty, bounded rationality and reasonable disagreement on the content of 
Convention rights, the Court frequently has to take a decision as to whether it is better 
suited than other domestic institutions to correctly and effectively implement Convention 
rights, thus bringing comparative institutional abilities into play. In section 4, and in the 
current absence of extensive ǯ
of domestic authorities, I briefly rehearse some of the generic arguments about 
comparative institutional abilities provided in the institutionalist literature. To the extent 
that these arguments apply to the ECtHR, they lend plausibility to the claim that under 
certain circumstances the Court is worse placed than (some) national authorities to decide 
on violations of Convention rights. Hence, in these cases, uses of MoA by the Court to lower 
its standard of review can be pro tanto justified. What might these circumstances be? I 
contend that a full answer should await further comparative empirical research, because 
justified allocations of decision-making power within the ECHR supervene upon complex 
empirical considerations. However, in section 5, I provide some further generic exploration 
of the subject, ǯ
6 
and social policy of States Parties. This seems ideally suited for the purpose of presenting 
an initial defence of the normative relevance of empirical institutional characteristics, since 
the Court has consistently used MoA to dismiss out of hand the vast majority of 
applications alleging violations of Convention rights on the grounds that national ǮǯǤ
arguing in favour of an empiricist research agenda in order to shed further light on MoA. 
 
2. MOA, UNDERENFORCEMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL REASONS 
 
What does it mean to say that the Court underenforces Convention rights, and how is 
underenforcement related to MoA? The most influential conceptual account of 
underenforcement is due to constitutional theorist Lawrence Sager, who is also responsible 
for coining the term.22 Sager proposes unpacking underenforcement in terms of a 
distinction between concepts and conceptions. According to Sager, an agent underenforces 
a legal norm whenever the agent puts forth a conception of the norm, oǡǯǡǮǯǡ   ǯ Ǯ ǯ23, to wit, the 
concept contained in the norm. Thus, according to Sager the crucial feature of 
underenforcement is that the construct does not exhaust the conceptual limit of the norm. 
Hence, the underenforced norm retains its full validity as regards its application by agents 
other than the underenforcing agent. 
                                                                    
22 L Sager above n 2. For a related approach see R Fallon Implementing the Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 2001). 
23 L Sager above n 2 at 1213. 
7 
Sager believes that in the specific context of US constitutional law, the Supreme ǯ        	 ǯ    
Protection clauses provides telling examples of such an underenforcement practice.24 By 
relying heavily on the so- Ǯ ǯ        
before it, the US Supreme Court refrains from substantively scrutinizing the choices made 
by states, especially when it comes to reviewing their schemes of taxation or business 
regulation.25   ǣ Ǯe test incorporates a theory and practice of extreme         ǯǤ26 However, Sager also maintains 
that judicial underenforcement of the Equal Protection clause does not imply that the 
clause is not otherwise valid to its full conceptual limits as regards officials other than the 
judiciary.27 Accordingly, judicial underenforcement of legal norms is conceived as an 
exercise of self-restraint aimed at stopping short of interpreting or applying the norms to 
their full conceptual boundaries, while also recognizing that these boundaries potentially 
retain their validity in relation to other institutional agents. 
Judicial underenforcement of legal norms in the above sense invites an immediate 
objection. On the face of it, underenforcement appears to be a renunciation of judicial 
responsibility, since it entails that the judge will lower her standard of review below the 
full conceptual boundary of a norm, despite the fact that her mission is precisely to 
                                                                    
24 L Sager above n 2 at 1216; R Fallon above n 22 p 5. 
25 See, for example, FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 US 307 at 313- ? ? ?ǣ Ǯ
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines [e.g. race, national origin, 
religion, or alienage] nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection 
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the Ǥǥ          Ǥǥ ȏȐ    
subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or 
empirical data.ǯ; quoted by R Fallon above n 22 at 78. 
26 L Sager above n 2 at 1215 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
27 L Sager above n 2 at 1226. 
8 
interpret and apply that same norm to the case before her.28 Sager answers this objection 
by arguing that judicial underenforcement can be explained and justified through reference 
to specific institutional concerns that apply to the judiciary.29 Underenforcement thus rests 
on a distinction between substantive and institutional reasons in the interpretation and 
application of legal norms. Substantive reasons would correspond to what Sager calls the Ǯǯnorm. They are the considerations by virtue of which the 
norms have their distinctive content. These considerations are operative in abstraction of 
their having to be applied by particular institutional agents. For example, and in the specific 
context of the ECHR, substantive reasons, identifiable by reference to theories of human 
rights and to principles of political morality30, determine the content of Convention rights 
in abstraction of the fact that the ECHR is susceptible to be applied by national legislatures, 
administrative agencies and courts, as well as by the Court itself. On the other hand, 
institutional reasons apply specifically        ǯ
powers and responsibilities within a wider scheme of institutional cooperation. In the 
domestic context, such institutional reasons are first and foremost identified through 
constitutional doctrines of the separation of powers. In view of the above, we can restate ǯ    ǣ    e of 
deliberately abstaining from considering some of the substantive reasons determining the 
interpretation and application of the norms because of institutional reasons that apply 
specifically to the enforcing agent. 
                                                                    
28 R Fallon above n 22 p 111. 
29 L Sager above n 2 pp 1222Ȃ1228. 
30 For a liberal construal of the substantive considerations that determine the content of Convention rights 
see G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2009) pp 99Ȃ119. 
9 
The underenforcement function of MoA should by this point have become apparent. 
Typically, the Court uses MoA to lower its standard of review, claiming that ǯ
authorities are Ǯ ǯ      arrive at an all-things-considered 
judgment on alleged violations.31 Two features make such invocations of MoA instances of 
underenforcement of the Convention in the sense specified above. Firstly, like the US 
Supreme Court and many other constitutional and supreme courts around the world,32 the 
Court frequently refrains from reviewing the decisions of national authorities under the 
best substantive theory of Convention rights. Instead, its standard of review consists in   Ǯǯ Ǥ 33  Secondly, the Court explicitly states that 
underenforcement of Convention rights is justified on institutional grounds, to wit, by the Ǯǯ certain kinds 
of issues.34 This attitude of the Court is prevalent in numerous areas of its case law.35 
Among other things, it ǯomes to assessing limitations 
on the rights of Articles 8Ȃ11 of the Convention. The Court thus frequently resorts to the 
argument that the absence of consensus among States Parties affords the latter an MoA in 
                                                                    
31 See eg cases of the Court cited above n 5.  
32 To provide just one example, the French Constitutional Council commonly resorts to the argument that its Ǯǯ ǡǯacts. See eg its recent decision no 2013-341 QPC (27 September 2013) at 
para 6. 
33 For an extensive overview of the recent case law of the Court in this respect, see J ÀǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?Nether Q Hum Rights 324 at 
330ǣ ǮIn all these circumstances the Court seems to use the doctrine as a vehicle which influences the 
strictness of the requirements imposed on States. When the margin is narrow, the bar for finding a violation 
of the Convention is presumably set high and the ensuing obligation is more stringent. The margin works Ǥǯ 
34 See Ireland v UK above n 4.  
35 For an overview, see H C Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human 
Rights Jurisprudence (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996); E ǡ Ǯ-
law of the European Court of Human Rights: Compliance or Cross-ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ? ?Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 240; S Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and 
Discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe Publishing 2000); J Kratochvíl 
above n 33. 
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the determination of limitations to these rights, when it comes to balancing them with the 
realization of collective goals such as public order, security, health or morals.36 
Construing MoA as an underenforcement doctrine justified by institutional reasons 
deflects some of the objections frequently marshalled against it. For example, critics argue 
that MoA amounts to a form of relativism by virtue of which the content of Convention 
rights would depend on the divergent moral conceptions of States Parties37, or, especially 
in the context of restrictions to the rights enshrined by Articles 8Ȃ11 of the Convention, 
that it gives leeway to a rampant utilitarian calculus threatening the very concept of human 
rights.38 In so doing, they simply assume that substantive reasons should be the sole 
deter   ǯ . However, if one takes the view that institutional 
considerations stemming from the institutional structure of the ECHR could justify 
underenforcement of Convention rights, then one need make no concessions either to 
relativism or to utilitarianism. An objectivist (as opposed to relativist) and liberal (as 
opposed to utilitarian) theory of Convention rights is fully compatible with the claim that 
these rights are to be implemented in ways that depend in part on (equally objective) 
reasons that apply to the implementing agent because of its particular institutional position 
and characteristics.39 
Before we proceed further, two caveats. Firstly, institutional considerations 
justifying underenforcement of Convention rights are only pro tanto. They can be 
overridden, in specific instances, by competing considerations that either favour full 
                                                                    
36 	         ǯ      ?Ȃ11 on limitations of 
Convention rights on grounds of public morals see G Letsas above n 30 pp 92Ȃ98. 
37 E Benvenisti above n 9 at 844. 
38 
ǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?Oxf J L S 705 at 729. 
39 For a related point, see J A ǡǮǣ
Human Rights in the Post-ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?ǯ 459. 
11 
examination of the substantive merits of a particular case or require abstention from 
recognizing an MoA to the respondent state because of the importance of the right 
involved.40  Secondly, MoA is a complex and multifaceted legal doctrine 41  that can 
incorporate a large number of different and sometimes conflicting concerns, of which 
underenforcement is only a part. No claim is made here that MoA is merely an 
underenforcement doctrine, or that the Court always uses it in a coherent and justified 
way.42 A fortiori, it is not argued that judicial uses of MoA for all practical purposes can be 
solely justified on institutionally informed underenforcement grounds. For example, 
George Letsas has usefully    Ǯǯ   Ǯǯ
concept of MoA.43 According to Letsas, the substa    Ǯ   ǯǤ44 Conversely, the structural Ǯis to address the limits or intensity of the review of the European Court of 
Human Rights in view of its sta    ǯǤ45 What follows from the 
discussion thus far is merely that underenforcement of Convention rights relates to what 
Letsas dubs the Ǯstructuralǯ concept of MoA. There is no reason to suppose that all the 
practical concerns subsumed under the       ǮMoAǯ, 
                                                                    
40 ǣǮǥnon-
derogable rights (right to life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery and forced labour, prohibition of 
retrospective legislation, the ne bis in idem ȌǤǯ ȋǤ ǡ Ǯ     
Court of Human Rights and the ǣǫǯ
(2012), CELS Working Paper, at 11, available at 
http://www.cels.law.cam.ac.uk/cels_lunchtime_seminars/Spielmann%20-
%20margin%20of%20appreciation%20cover.pdf). 
41 On the notion of legal doctrine that is at issue here see M Berman Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
Virg L R 1; D Kyritsis Ǯǣ Proportionalitǯ Oxf J L S (2014) 395. 
42 Some critics of MoA have insisted that the doctrine is indeterminate or even incoherent; see eg J Kratochvíl 
above n 33 at 336Ȃ343; J A Brauch above n 6; C S Feingold Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?-8) 53 Notre Dame L R 90.  
43 G Letsas above n 38 at 709Ȃ715 and 720Ȃ724. 
44 G Letsas above n 38 at 706. 
45 G Letsas above n 38 at 706. 
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including what Letsas calls the Ǯsubstantiveǯ concept of MoA, could be explained and 
justified in the same way. 
 
3. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, SUBSIDIARITY AND COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
ABILITIES 
 
Even under the assumption that institutional considerations are genuine reasons justifying 
underenforcement invocations of MoA, the argument up to this point does not yet entail 
that they comprise empirical variables about the competence of various candidate 
decision-makers. Indeed, relying on empirical facts to justify underenforcing the 
Convention would appear to rest on a category mistake, since it flouts the distinction 
between the empirical and the normative.46 In a nutshell, the objection would be that 
empirical facts about institutional abilities are entirely irrelevant when it comes to 
applying human rights and responding to the claims of applicants. Whatever the status of 
institutional reasons, application of the Convention would still be a normative, not an 
empirical matter. Hence, underenforcement aspects of MoA could be defended, if at all, only 
by resorting to high-level normative theorizing in the identification of pertinent 
institutional reasons. 
My proposed response to the above objection is straightforward. Empirical facts 
about institutional abilities are not normatively relevant as such in the justification of 
underenforcement of the ECHR. They only become relevant through higher-order 
normative institutional considerations. Two kinds of normative considerations appear 
                                                                    
46 For a particularly forceful way of distinguishing between the empirical and the normative as regards legal 
facts, see H Kelsen Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992) pp 7Ȃ14. 
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particularly promising in this regard. Firstly, to the extent that the ECtHR is a judicial 
institution, it raises concerns regarding the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation 
created through democratic procedures. These concerns point to traditional doctrines of 
separation and cooperation of judicial and legislative or executive powers in sharing the 
responsibility of implementation of the Convention in the particular ECHR context.47 
Moreover, we should also place emphasis on the fact that the Court seeks the help of 
domestic judicial institutions by asking them to infuse its reasoning into their decision-
making about Convention rights. Secondly, inasmuch as the ECtHR is an international ǡ      ǯ    Ǥ
The supranational character of the Court underscores the role of the principle of 
subsidiarity, which purports to regulate the proper allocation of decision-making power 
between supranational and national institutions.48  Taken together, these normative 
considerations make empirical facts about institutional abilities relevant, since they 
frequently point to the need to identify the decision-maker that has a comparative 
advantage when it comes to correctly implementing Convention rights under conditions of 
uncertainty, bounded rationality, time pressure and reasonable disagreement. In the 
following two sections I will take up these issues in turn. I stress, though, that my intention 
is not to offer a full account of shared institutional responsibility and subsidiarity. I shall 
merely focus on aspects that are pertinent for the purpose of my argument, which is to lend 
plausibility to the claim that justified uses of MoA are a function of, among other things, 
empirical institutional variables. 
 
                                                                    
47 D Kyritsis above n 10. 
48 See A von Staden above n 11; P Carozza above n 15. 
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(a) Shared responsibility 
 
The ECtHR is a judicial institution that resolves disputes involving individuals on alleged 
violations of Convention rights. This is surely one of its most important roles.49 However, ǯ-resolution mechanism would be a mistake. 
The institutional role of the Court is much more intricate than that. As a judicial institution, 
the Court is placed within a wider division of institutional labour that has traditionally 
been conceptualized by means of doctrines of separation of powers.50 To the extent that it ǡǯcomprises 
supervision of the decisions of national legislatures and control of the quality of the 
decisions of national courts which, in virtue of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, 
are typically the first to hear complaints about alleged breaches of Convention rights. Qua 
court lacking in democratic legitimacy, the ECtHR must make use of its institutional 
independence with care, paying due respect to the political decisions of national 
legislatures.51 The Court must also pay attention to the complex systemic effects of its 
judgments on other branches of national government in the overall project of 
implementation of the Convention.52 Thus, far from merely interpreting the Convention or 
applying it to individual cases under its best understanding of Convention rights in the 
                                                                    
49 Thus, formally decisions by the Court only have an inter partes legal effect; it is debatable whether they also 
have erga omnes legal force and, if so, on what basis. See J B M Zupancic ǮConstitutional Law and the        ǣ     ǯ (2001) 2 Germ L J 
(available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=30). 
50 D Kyritsis above n 10; D Kyritsis Shared Authority. Courts and Legislatures in Legal Theory (Oxford and 
Portland Oregon: Hart 2015). 
51 D Kyritsis above n 10 at 315Ȃ318. 
52 On some of these systemic effects, see L Helfer Ǯ     n Rights: ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ǯ 
125 at 134Ȃ138; L Helfer and E Voeten Ǯǣ 
ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?ǯ 77. 
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abstract, the Court also assumes a central coordinating role in implementing the ECHR, by 
closely cooperating with national institutional agents, which comprise legislatures, courts 
and administrative agencies. 
Implementation of the Convention is not a task that various national and 
supranational institutions could ever perform in isolation, but a complex collective 
endeavour demanding particularly painstaking efforts at close collaboration. Successfully 
implementing a human rights international instrument across 47 countries and 820 million 
citizens is an ambitious project that can only be brought about by multifarious patterns of 
institutional division of labour.53 Implementation of the Convention is thus a joint 
endeavour, in which the Court and a variety of national institutions enter as partners. At   ǡ           ǯ bona fide 
opinions regarding the content of Convention rights, especially if these partners wield 
democratic legitimacy.  
As already observed, all courts, irrespective of whether they are domestic or 
supranational, have to pay heed to considerations stemming from their function in a 
particular form of institutional division of labour. However, such considerations are 
particularly pronounced as regards the ECtHR, because of two important and pervasive 
facts. Firstly, the Court is not part of the formal judicial hierarchy that characterizes 
domestic judicial decision-making and it thus lacks the coercive power that higher 
domestic courts exercise over lower ones.54 Moreover, inǯǡ
small number of exceptions, are not executable in the same way as rulings issued by 
                                                                    
53 L Helfer above n 52; L Caflisch ǮǣǤ  ? ?ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ?Hum Rights L R 403; S Greer above n 11 pp 136Ȃ192. 
54 L Helfer above n 52 at 135. 
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domestic courts,      ǯ     ǡ   
convince them to effectively implement its judgments.55 Secondly, the Court issues its 
judgments under conditions of value pluralism and (frequently reasonable) disagreement 
in and among States Parties.56 Here again, there is a difference of degree, if not of kind, from 
the domestic context: reasonable value pluralism in the enormous cultural and 
geographical space of the Council of Europe is considerably more pervasive and intense. 
While t ǯ incremental and deferential approach is not justified without further 
qualification, since its correctness ultimately depends on the best way of balancing 
substantive against institutional reasons in the effective protection of human rights, it is 
clearly marked by a legitimacy-enhancing quest for consensus when it comes to resolving 
controversial moral and political issues.57 
Thus, under the characteristic structure of the Convention partnership, national 
institutions are jointly responsible with the Court for upholding Convention rights. This 
collaborative aspect is recognized first and foremost by Article 1 of the Convention,58 as 
well as by Article 13, which enjoins States Parties to provide effective domestic remedies 
for individuals alleging violations of their ECHR rights.59 It has also been acknowledged by 
States Parties themselves, the vast majority of which have incorporated the Convention, 
thus creating an obligation addressed to national legislatures and courts to comply with the 
                                                                    
55 G Ress Ǯudgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the Domestic Legal ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?ǯ 359 at 374; L Helfer above n 52 at 135. 
56 On the concept of reasonable disagreement see J Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press 1 ? ? ?ȌǤǯ
disagreement on the level of international law see J Rawls, Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press 2002). 
57 See eg K ǡ Ǯǫegitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌP L 534. 
58   ?    ǣ Ǯ         
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Ǥǯ 
59 On the gradual jurisprudential construction of an expansive understanding of Article 13 see L Helfer above 
n 52 at 144Ȃ146. 
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ECHR and to use it actively in their own decision-making.60 Moreover, various recent      ǡ    Ǯ ǯ ǡ61 
which has been described as a sui generis    Ǯ   ǯǡ62 as well as proposals for future reform, such as the possibility for the 
Court to provide advisory opinions,63 underscore the necessarily collaborative character of 
the joint endeavour. In pilot judgment procedures, the Court does not just address the 
claims of a particular individual applicant, but identifies general systemic defects that 
extend to large classes of individuals.64 Thus, in the seminal Broniowski v Poland case,65 the           ǯ   ǡ         ? ?Ǥ ǡ    Ǯ
respondent State must, through appropriate legal measures and administrative practices,         ǯǤ66 Subsequently, the Court 
reviewed the solution chosen by the Polish legislature in the successful implementation of 
Article 1 (P1- ?ȌǮǯǤ67 The structural features 
of the Convention highlighted above point towards a more general conclusion. Under the 
                                                                    
60 L Helfer above n 52 at 141Ȃ ? ? ?ǤǮǯǡ contrasts 
it wǮǯȋ ? ? at 134Ȃ138). 
61 See the seminal judgment in Broniowski v Poland App no 31443/96 (ECtHR 22 June 2004); L Helfer above n 
52 at 146Ȃ149. 
62 L Helfer above n 52 at 148. 
63 Ǥ  ? ?ǡ ǣ Ǯ ǯ              
national authorities and thereby reinforce implementation of the Convention, in accordance with the ǯǤ 
64 See Broniowski v Poland (above n 61Ȍ ? ? ?ǣǮAlthough it is in principle not for the Court to determine 
what remedial measures may be appropriate to satisfy the respondent State's obligations under Article 46 of 
the Convention, in view of the systemic situation which it has identified, the Court would observe that general 
measures at national level are undoubtedly called for in execution of the present judgment, measures which Ǥǯ 
65 Broniowski v Poland (above n 61) at para 193. 
66 Broniowski v Poland (above n 61), fourth holding. 
67 Broniowski v Poland App no 31443/96 (ECtHR 28 September 2005); see H Keller, M Forowicz and L Engi, 
Friendly Settlements Before the European Court of Human Rights: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2010). 
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ECHR partnership, the Court trusts that all national institutions, courts, legislatures and 
administrative agencies alike, will give pride of place to its reasoning, so as to infuse their 
decision-making with Convention rights considerations in their ordinary functioning.68 
Sharing responsibility with national authorities in the implementation of the 
Convention triggers considerations of comparative institutional ability, sometimes 
justifying underenforcement, in the following way. Under conditions of uncertainty, 
bounded rationality, time pressure and reasonable disagreement, members of the Court are 
sometimes presented with a difficult institutional choice.69 Should they try to identify the 
substantive considerations of the case at hand on their own, or should they rather, at least 
in some circumstances, invoke MoA to underenforce the Convention and defer to the 
judgment of their partners, to wit, national institutions, at least if they sincerely believe 
that these institutions are more likely to reach a correct decision? In making up their mind, 
judges implicitly rest on a judgment regarding comparative institutional abilities, whose 
main variables are empirical. 
Note that institutional choice in the above sense is normatively relevant because 
judges of the Court share responsibility with national institutions in the implementation of  Ǥ   ǯ     ǡ among other things, in 
participating in a shared project together with national authorities, but was strictly 
confined to passing judgment on individual complaints, judges would be under an 
unequivocal duty to do everything in their power to respond as best as they could to 
individual applications on their separate merits. Deferring to the decisions of national 
institutions would simply be out of the question. However, insofar as the Court cooperates 
                                                                    
68 L Helfer above n 52. 
69 A Vermeule above n 21 p  ? ? ?Ǥ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closely with national institutions in the larger project of implementation of the Convention, 
it can sometimes legitimately conclude that national institutions, because of their specific 
abilities, are better placed than the Court itself to pass judgment on certain contentious 
issues. As part of this joint project, the Court relies on others not in order to abdicate its 
responsibility, but in order to discharge it as best it can. Underenforcement of the ECHR is 
justified because ǯ effective implementation, not in spite of it. 
 
(b) Subsidiarity 
 
Subsidiarity concerns warrant similar normative conclusions. The principle of subsidiarity 
is firmly grounded in the context of the ECHR system.70 Not only has it been recently 
explicitly added to the Preamble of the Convention through the adoption of Protocol 15 
along with MoA itself,71 but it was also frequently mentioned by the Court even before 
Protocol 15 was made open for signature.72 The principle seems to flow naturally from 
some of the most basic structural institutional features of the Convention system, to wit, 
the obligation of States Parties to primarily secure themselves the rights enshrined in the 
ECHR73 and the procedural rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, combined with the 
obligation to invoke alleged violations of Convention rights before national authorities, on 
                                                                    
70 P Carozza above n 15 at 40. 
71  ?Ǥ ? ?ǡǣǮAffirming that the High 
Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure 
the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy 
a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights Ǥǯ 
72 In this respect, see the seminal Belgian Linguistic Case (1968) Series A no 6 at para 10 and Handyside v UK 
(1976) ECHR 5; from the more recent case law see Selmouni v France App no 28503/94 (ECtHR 28 July 1999) 
at para 74; Kudla v Poland App no 30210/96 (ECtHR 28 October 2000) at para 152. 
73 Cf. Article 1 of the Convention. 
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pain of inadmissibility.74 The Court itself ritualistically repeats that it is not a court of 
fourth instance and, with some notable exceptions,75 that it has no independent powers of 
fact-finding. Besides, the principle of subsidiarity is hardly a normative terra incognita. The ǯ         ǡ   
basic conceptual contours, along with its ambiguities, would seem by now to be firmly 
established.76 There are solid, albeit disputed, reasons to think that the principle could be 
normatively appealing in its own right.77 
As already stated, it is not my intention in what follows to provide a full normative 
account of subsidiarity, nor even a full account of subsidiarity within the ECHR system. I 
will confine myself to highlighting those features of subsidiarity that justify the thesis that 
empirical characteristics of candidate decision-makers are normatively pertinent in the 
justification of MoA. Subsidiarity applies in circumstances involving the distribution of 
powers between decision-making bodies located at different levels (typically a higher-level 
central unit and lower-level sub-units).78 According to a standard definition, provided by 
Andreas Føllesdal, subsidiarity stipulates that when two bodies are concurrently 
responsible for exercising the same power, Ǯ       -
level sub-units of that order unless allocating them to a higher-level central unit would 
ensure higher ǯǤ79 
                                                                    
74 Cf. Article 35 para 1 of the Convention. The Court holds that, in order to be admissible, the complaint that a 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v Spain App no 11798/85 (ECtHR 23 April 1992) at para 32; Azinas v Cyprus App no 56679/00 (ECtHR 28 
April 2004) at paras 40Ȃ41. 
75 L Helfer above n 52 at 142Ȃ144. 
76 See eg A Estella de Noriega The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2002); P ǡǮǣǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?J Com Market S 72. 
77 P Carozza above n 15 at 40Ȃ49; A von Staden above n 11 at 1033Ȃ1038; A Føllesdal above n 15 at 198Ȃ213. 
78 A Føllesdal above n 15 at 193Ȃ197. 
79 A Føllesdal above n 15 at 190. 
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Correspondingly, subsidiarity is understood as putting forward a criterion of 
efficiency when it comes to deciding whether to attribute decision-making power to a 
central unit in the realization of a commonly shared objective. Allocation of decision-
making power to the central unit is justified only if that allocation is the best way of 
realizing the objective. Under this characterization of subsidiarity, the link with MoA as an 
underenforcement doctrine is direct: underenforcement of Convention rights is justified 
whenever national authorities, because of their superior institutional abilities, are better 
placed than the Court itself to effectively pass judgment on the interpretation or 
application of the ECHR. Conversely, the principle of subsidiarity is flouted whenever the 
Court tries by its own powers to decide on alleged violations of the ECHR, which could be 
more effectively tracked by deferring to the judgment of national institutions. The principle 
thus makes comparative institutional abilities normatively relevant in a straightforward 
way. In this respect, the efficiency reading of the principle of subsidiarity squares 
particularly well with the related principle of the effectiveness of Convention rights, first 
set out by the Court in its Airey v Ireland judgment: Ǯ    
guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and Ǥǯ80 ǡ    ǡ Ǯ ǯ ǡ         
institutions. Under conditions of uncertainty and reasonable disagreement, shared 
responsibility in the implementation of the Convention along with subsidiarity concerns 
                                                                    
80 Airey v Ireland ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ     ? ?    ? ?Ǥ  Ǯ  ǯ   -established 
principle of interpretation in international law. See eg H Laǡ Ǯ   ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?Br Year ǯ 48. 
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can justify deference to national decision-makers that are best suited, because of their 
particular institutional abilities, to pass judgment on a number of alleged violations. In 
these circumstances, underenforcement of the ECHR on institutional grounds is justified. 
Identifying the circumstances necessitates detailed empirical enquiry into the comparative 
institutional abilities of candidate Convention implementers. Hence, low-level empirical 
theorizing is necessary for the identification of the specific conditions under which 
underenforcement uses of MoA are justified. 
 
4. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ABILITIES: A GENERIC OUTLINE 
 
Despite its importance from both an explanatory and a justificatory point of view, concrete 
empirical work on the institutional features of candidate decision-makers within the 
Convention scheme has only recently begun to take off.81 This empirical work is primarily 
directed at studying the institutional workings of the Court itself and much less so at   ǯ      Ǥ82 This absence of 
empirical comparative research on the institutional determinants of legal interpretation is 
a more general phenomenon that cuts across jurisdictions and, possibly, legal cultures. In  ǯ ǡ Ǯ       ǯǤ83 Still, there is an 
evolving institutionalist literature on generic features that can determine the comparative 
abilities of legislatures, courts and administrative agencies.84 In this section I will briefly 
                                                                    
81 See eg E  Ǯ    ǣ 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82 E Voeten above n 81; Helfer and Voeten above n 52. 
83 A Vermeule above n 21 p 153. 
84 See eg A Vermeule above n 21; N Komesar above n 20; C Sunstein and A Vermeule Ǯ ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ?Mich L R 885. 
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rehearse some of the arguments provided in this literature and discuss what they entail for 
the construction of an empirical research agenda on underenforcement aspects of MoA. In ǯ in the assessment of the economic and 
social policies of States Parties. I will argue that considerations of comparative institutional 
ability could be plausibly considered as a central part of the justification of 
underenforcement uses of MoA in this particular setting. 
Following Andrew Coan85 I will use the term Ǯcǯ     
ability of institutions to take reliably good decisions. Coan contrasts competence with Ǯǯǡ decisions a given institution can take within a 
given amount of time, while maintaining its adherence to certain qualitative standards of 
decision-making.86 The salience of actual institutional abilities becomes apparent once one 
considers the significant gap between ideal and non-ideal decision-making. Ideal  decision-
making would be the decision-making of an omniscient agent under ideal conditions, say, of 
a legislator, a judge or an administrative agency that is fully rational, fully informed, 
perfectly well-motivated and capable of deliberating without time restrictions.87 From such 
a vantage point, institutions would be frictionless and their activity would bear no decision 
or information costs. This kind of frictionless functioning of institutions is to be contrasted 
with the real-life challenges faced by flesh-and-blood political agents. In the actual world, 
agents function under non-ideal conditions. Their rationality is bounded,88 their access to 
information is limited,89 their information-processing capacity is restricted and in the grip 
                                                                    
85 A Coan Ǯ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86 A Coan above n 85 at 105Ȃ106. 
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ǡn whom see R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press 1978) Chapter 4. 
88 A Vermeule above n 21 pp 154Ȃ156. 
89 A Vermeule above n 21 at 110Ȃ112. 
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of various cognitive biases,90 and they are under relentless time pressure, due either to the 
vicissitudes of everyday politics or, more simply, to the ever-increasing volume of their 
caseload. The resources available to institutional agents thus place important constraints 
on their decision-making ability. Moreover, the fact that legislatures, courts and 
administrative agencies are multimember institutions implies that there is the permanent 
possibility of significant slack between optimal individual reasoning strategies and the 
potential results of the aggregation of these strategies.91 Last, but not least, the possibility 
of strategic interaction with other agents places additional constraints and cognitive 
burdens on bona fide decision-makers. 
In the specific context of the justification of judicial underenforcement of the ECHR, 
comparative institutional analysis aims to track the relative advantages and disadvantages 
of various candidate decision-makers in the implementation of the Convention. Thus, it is 
important to stress that pointing out the institutional limitations and constraints of a given 
decision-maker, say those of the Court, would be sufficient to ground a pro tanto reason in 
favour of underenforcement of the ECHR only once it had been established that other 
institutions, with which the Court shares responsibility in implementing the Convention, 
would be more likely than the Court itself to reach reliably good decisions. As Neil Komesar 
has forcefully suggested,92 pointing to the limitations and deficiencies of a given type of 
institution in a complex scheme of governance justifies allocating decision-making power 
to some other institution only if it is shown that the second institution does not itself suffer 
from comparable deficiencies. Because no real-world institution is frictionless, Komesar 
                                                                    
90 A Vermeule above n 21 at 155. 
91 A Vermeule, The System of the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press 2011).  
92 N Komesar above n 20. 
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contends that single-institutional analysis should be replaced by comparative institutional 
analysis, consisting in weighing the relative pros and cons of different kinds of institutions 
in distinctive kinds of decision-making contexts.93 In the following sections, I will abstract 
from these specific contexts, as well as from the fact that the ECtHR is an international 
court, and briefly concentrate on four generic institutional variables that can determine the 
comparative institutional abilities of candidate decision-makers: cognitive limitations, time, 
scale and independence. 
 
 (a) Cognitive limitations 
 
When compared to the frequently messy decision-making procedures followed by 
democratically elected legislatures, which include bargaining, responsiveness to the 
sometimes irrational preferences of constituents or opaque compromises made behind 
closed doors that are only partly assessed on their merits, courts are often understood to 
be bodies whose deliberation is of a particularly high quality. To take two particularly 
characteristic examples, John Rawls in Political Liberalism described courts as exemplary 
deliberative institutions upholding public reason94, while Lawrence Sager maintains that 
courts are preferred venues for participating in the deliberative as opposed to the electoral 
mode of exploring answers to questions of fundamental rights.95 In a nutshell, according to 
the conventional narrative in favour of constitutional review of legislation, democratically 
elected legislatures are habitually seen as tainted by a number of cognitive limitations 
                                                                    
93 N Komesar above n 20 pp 3Ȃ13. 
94 J Rawls above n 56 at 231-240. 
95 L Sager, Justice in Plainclothes. A Theory of American Constitutional Justice (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press 2004) at 203. 
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which stem from their specific institutional structure, while courts are supposedly free of 
those limitations.  
However, this conventional narrative has barely gone unchallenged. On the flipside, 
Adrian Vermeule has provided an in-depth and complex analysis of the cognitive 
limitations that are specific to courts, the main findings of which can only be cursorily 
examined here.96 According to Vermeule, generalist judges formally trained only as lawyers 
are constrained, among other things, as regards the information to which they have access, 
their limited capacity to process that information given its complexity and the limited 
perspective of judges deciding issues on a case-by-case basis.97 Because of these limitations, 
judges frequently have to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, which extends 
both to the merits of the individual case before them and, more importantly, to the complex 
systemic effects of their choices.98 Moreover, jǯ deficiencies call for special monitoring 
and error-correcting institutional mechanisms, which can be unavailable in certain 
contexts or, if available, can considerably raise correction costs.99 In a similar vein, 
administrative agencies may score high on the expertise dimension in comparison to both 
legislatures and courts, but are also cognitively limited by virtue of the fact that they issue 
directives solely for restricted domains falling within their jurisdiction, often overlooking 
the broader systemic effects of their decisions.100   
Overall, cognitive limitations of legislatures, courts and administrative agencies are 
potential sources of error that place constraints on  ǯ competence and 
threaten their ability to systematically arrive at reliably good decisions. The specific forms 
                                                                    
96 For a fuller treatment of the cognitive limitations of judges see A Vermeule above n 21 pp 153Ȃ182. 
97 A Vermeule above n 21 p 77. 
98 A Vermeule above n 21 pp 123Ȃ129. 
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they take can only be identified through concrete empirical analysis of the workings of 
these institutions. However, especially as concerns the cognitive side, generalist judges 
appear particularly disadvantaged when compared to specialized administrative agencies 
and legislatures in decision-making contexts involving either technical expertise or large-
scale and complex calculations.101 ǣ ǮȏȐ
the ability of the adjudicative process to deal with large-scale social policy issues where 
there are many conflicting interests and a continuing need for implementation and Ǥǯ102 
 
(b) Time 
 
Time affects competence in a crucial but relatively underestimated way.103 Normally, 
courts as well as administrative agencies are under a duty to deliver their decisions in a 
timely manner. The duty can either flow from informal norms of conduct or be formally 
recognized as a special legal duty: such, for example, is the case of Article 6 of the ECHR, 
which explicitly enshrines the right to a fair trial within reasonable time. Such a duty places 
a considerable constraint on courts and administrative agencies, since it reduces available 
time for gathering information and deliberating on the merits of a particular case, 
depending on the volume of thǯ caseload.  
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In recent work104 Andrew Coan contends that, in specific relation to courts, time 
constraints are exacerbated from the adherence of judges to certain professional and 
qualitative standards.105 Indeed, both judges and administrative agencies could decide 
particular cases hastily, and therefore increase their  capacity, but not without giving up 
their commitment to certain standards of deliberation and justification. These standards 
appear especially stringent as far as courts are concerned, since in their case there is a 
standing expectation of reason-giving of high quality. So judges have to keep the total 
volume of litigation in check without infringing their commitment to certain professional 
standards.106 Likewise, administrative agencies often lack control of their capacity, since 
quantitative goals are hierarchically set. While both judges and administrative agencies can 
choose among a range of different rational responses to pressures resulting from the 
volume of their caseload,107 limiting the amount of time devoted to each case appears as a 
necessary result. In this respect, ǯ capacity can be usefully contrasted with 
that of legislatures. Legislatures have the ability, at least under certain circumstances, to 
expand their capacity at will, by extending the amount of time they afford to information-
gathering and to deliberation, before proceeding to decision-making. 
 
(c) Scale 
 
Neil Komesar has underscored the importance of scale when it comes to comparing the 
institutional abilities of courts with thos  Ǥ  Ǯǯ   Ǯ
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105 A Coan above n 85 at 105Ȃ106. 
106 A Coan above n 85 at 110. 
107 A Coan above n 85 at 111-112. 
29 
resources of budget available to the judiciary and the constraints on the expansion of the     ǯǤ108 The crucial consideration is that courts, unlike 
legislatures, do not exercise any kind of meaningful control on their size, which entails that 
they cannot take the initiative to expand in order to increase their capacity. The result of 
this mismatch in expansion ability is that the potential for creation of demand for 
adjudicative services cannot be as easily met on the supply side. As Komeǡ Ǯ 
the relative ease with which the market and political process expand that creates the          ǯǤ109 It seems clear, ǡ  ǯ      agencies, which are only 
exceptionally able to control their own size and normally meet the demand for 
administrative decisions by relying on resources that they cannot expand at will. 
In relation to courts, Komesar points to a number of different possible rational 
strategies for addressing issues of increased demand for adjudication: creation of new 
courts, subject-matter specialization, control on the flow of litigation by decreasing the 
chances of success or the amount of damages awarded if successful, and articulation and 
imposition of simpler hard-and-fast rules providing easier solutions to help resolve 
potential disputes.110 The important point is that only some of those strategies depend on 
the initiative of courts and, mutatis mutandis, of administrative agencies. Besides, the size 
of the judiciary impacts on the way it can effectively supervise the workings of legislatures 
and administrative bodies. So constraints of scale can become crucial when it comes to 
assessing the actual performance of institutions. 
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(d) Independence 
 
Independence is a key structural feature that differentiates courts from other kinds of 
institutional agents.111 The independence of judges primarily consists in their being able to 
issue decisions in ways that are not constrained by electoral pressure or by the preferences ǡǮǯǤ112 In 
terms of comparative institutional abilities, judicial independence is traditionally perceived 
as placing courts in a particularly advantageous institutional position when it comes to 
supervising other branches of government.113    ǯ     Ǯ  ǯǡ114   Ǯ   
environment outside the hurly-   ǯǤ115 Moreover, in legal systems 
authorizing forms of constitutional review of legislative acts, courts insulated from the 
political process enjoy a comparative institutional advantage qua institutional mechanisms, 
as they can act to correct potential failures of the workings of representative legislatures, 
especially majoritarian bias.116 In a similar vein, independent administrative or regulatory 
agencies can also exemplify some of the above deliberative advantages within their 
particular domain of expertise, compared with the quality of deliberation proper to 
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ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?ǯ 669. 
113 D Kyritsis above n 10 at 320. 
114 R Dworkin A Matter of Principle (New York: Oxford University Press 1985) pp 33Ȃ71. 
115 R Fallon above n 22 p 40. 
116 D Kyritsis above n 10 at 321; A Føllesdal above n 15 at 600. 
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democratic legislatures, whose members are normally constrained to track the preferences 
of constituents. 
 
Let us now assume that these generic and rough comparative institutional pros and cons, 
suitably adjusted for some of the important institutional particularities of the ECHR 
system117, apply to potential ECHR decision-makers. These would comprise, apart from the 
Court itself, national legislatures, courts, as well as administrative agencies Even at this 
abstract stage, the emerging picture adds staggering complexity to candidate justifications 
of MoA. The relative institutional ability of the Court will depend in each particular case, or 
class of cases, on variables having to do with complexity of procession of information, 
uncertainty, costs of fact-gathering, calculation of systemic effects, time pressure and 
deliberative quality. The picture prompts two kinds of observations. Firstly, it is highly 
unlikely that it would be practically feasible to articulate in traditional doctrinal terms a 
one-size-fits-all theory for all legitimate underenforcement uses of MoA and for the totality 
of Convention rights. Depending on the specific configuration of relative institutional 
abilities and the kind of factual scenario with which it is confronted, the Court might do a 
better or worse job than national institutions in interpreting and applying different kinds 
of rights, or even the same rights in different kinds of factual circumstances. 
Correspondingly, different standards of review could be envisaged for different types of 
factual scenarios. To take one particularly salient example, at one end of the spectrum, 
international judges insulated from domestic politics seem better placed than national 
majoritarian representative institutions to decide upon the claims of oppressed minorities 
                                                                    
117 For an overview of which see L Helfer above n 52 at 134Ȃ141. 
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systematically facing the hostile external preferences of the majority.118 At the other end of 
the spectrum, domestic legislatures along with specialized administrative agencies seem to 
have enormous cognitive advantages when it comes to adjudicating, say, questions of social 
and economic policy, which necessitate, among other things, complex economic 
calculations   ǯ  resources. But there is no a priori reason to 
think that all kinds of factual situations map neatly onto certain kinds of institutional ability. 
Likewise, there is no reason to assume that comparative institutional abilities are static. 
Indeed, all institutions can learn by their continued exposure to cases, thus enhancing their 
abilities. Finally, there is no reason to think that all national institutions belong to the same 
category, as far as their decision-making abilities are concerned. In fact, various national 
legislatures, courts and administrative agencies may differ significantly with respect to 
their empirically verifiable abilities, despite their falling under the generic categories of Ǯ ǯǡ Ǯ  ǯ  Ǯ ǯǤ The 
complexity of the issues involved can provide an explanation as to why underenforcement 
uses of MoA have seemed to many commentators both intuitive and unprincipled, or even 
outright confused. 119  Because the justification of underenforcement uses of MoA 
supervenes on complex empirical factors, it resists formulation by simple doctrinal tests. 
Secondly, given the astounding complexity of the institutional determinants of 
justified uses of MoA and the lack of available information, we should expect judges to 
                                                                    
118 See, from the recent case law of the Court, Vallianatos and Others v Greece Apps. No 29381/09 and 
32684/09 (ECtHR 7 November 2013), which concerned a challenge to a Greek law creating a form of ȋǮǯȌ-sex couples. The Court has consistently held 
that in cases involv      ǡ    Ǯrequire ǲ    ǳ    Ǥǥ      ǯǤǥǤǯȋ ? ?ȌǤ 
119 See eg J A Brauch above n 6; J Kratochvíl above n 33. 
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rationally respond, when deciding cases under conditions of uncertainty, by resorting to 
various cognitive shortcuts, such as satisficing,120 simply picking a solution among those 
available 121  or using fast and frugal heuristics. 122  Under conditions of complexity, 
uncertainty and time pressure, use of these and other cognitive tools as hard and fast rules 
may lead judges to more reliable decision-making than efforts to decide each case on its 
own merits under their optimal substantive understanding of the Convention.123 On such a 
view, interpretive doctrines such as MoA sometimes do not reflect any deep underlying 
normative concerns about the nature of Convention rights themselves: they are merely 
forms of more or less reliable judicial heuristics under conditions of pervasive uncertainty 
that are due to the presence of constraints in decision-making.  
The upshot is that there is potentially more to be learned about justified uses of 
MoA through empirical comparative institutional analysis than by a traditional conceptual 
approach. Once such a prospect is allowed, it becomes possible to compare patterns of 
underenforcement uses of MoA with corresponding types of comparative institutional 
analysis, in order to verify whether judges were justified actually, not just potentially, in 
thinking that they were worse placed than national institutions to decide on the merits of a 
particular case or class of cases. Moreover, unlike high-level normative analysis that 
focuses on abstract normative concepts such as supranational constitutionalism and 
                                                                    
120 A Vermeule above n 21 pp 176Ȃ179. Under a satisficing reasoning strategy, a decision-maker seeks to ǮǯǮǯǢ Beyond Optimizing: A Study of Rational 
Choice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1989). 
121 A Vermeule above n 21 pp 179Ȃ180. 
122 A Vermeule above n 21 pp 180Ȃ181. On cognitive heuristics outside contexts of judicial decision, see D 
Kahneman, P Slovic and A Tversky (eds.) Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1982). 
123 On rule-consequentialism as a decision procedure see J Harsanyi Ǯǯ
(1977) 11 Erkenntnis 25; J Ǯǯ in A. Sen and B. Williams 
(eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982) pp 39Ȃ62. 
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democratic legitimacy without usually making any distinction between domestic 
institutions that belong to the same generic kind, low-level empirical research can help 
chart important differences between them, contributing thus to unearthing potentially 
unexplored patterns. For example, it would be interesting to investigate whether the Court 
places the same amount of trust on the decision-making abilities of different domestic 
legislatures, courts or administrative agencies by deferring to thǯreasoning 
through uses of MoA. If not, a further question would be whether relevant differences can       ǯ      the decisions 
respectively made by these institutions. And it could also be asked   ǯ
perception of comparative institutional abilities reflects those abilities accurately, in which 
case it would be warranted, or whether it results from negative bias towards the decision-
making capacities of certain domestic institutions. 
 
5. MOA AND THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF STATES PARTIES  
 
On the face of it, the Courtǯ  in judgments reviewing decisions regarding the 
social and economic policy of States Parties appears to exemplify exactly such an 
underenforcement pattern. In these kinds of cases, the Court typically adopts a double 
strategy. First, it offers a generous interpretation of ECHR rights, frequently accepting that 
such rights are pro tanto engaged despite the fact that the ECHR, unlike the European Social 
Charter, is not an international instrument specifically protecting socio-economic rights. 
Second, though, the Court also systematically uses an argument of comparative 
institutional abilities to lower its standard of review, offering leeway to respondent states 
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in the vast majority of cases and accepting the arguments of applicants only 
exceptionally.124 The point, moreover, is not so much that in these kinds of cases the Court 
would have necessarily found a violation but for the presence of institutional reasons 
justifying underenforcement of the ECHR. That would     ǯ 
substantive understanding of Convention rights and of the weight it attributes to 
institutional reasons when they conflict with substantive ones. The point, rather, is that the 
Court uses an argument of comparative institutional abilities to abstain from examining 
whether there has been a violation of an ECHR right in the first place, under an optimal 
substantive understanding of Convention rights.   
Consider, in this regard, the seminal James and Others judgment of 21 February 
1986.125 The case concerned a challenge to the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 as amended, 
which gave tenants residing in houses held on long leases the power to purchase 
compulsorily the freehold of the property on prescribed terms. The applicants claimed, 
among other things, that the compulsory transfer of their properties to tenants amounted 
to a breach of their right to property, protected by Article 1 (P1-1) of the Convention. They              Ǯǯǡ set out in the second sentence of Article 1 (P1-1), was not satisfied, because             ǯ
private benefit. In its judgment, the Court invoked MoA and justified underenforcing Article 
1(P1-1) by using a typical dictum referring to comparative institutional abilities (at para 
46): ǮBecause of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national 
                                                                    
124 D. Spielmann above n 40 at 16Ȃ ? ?ǣǮǤǯǤ 
125 James and Others v UK (1986) Series A no. 98. 
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authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is ǲin the public interestǳ.ǯ           Ǯ ǯ  Ǯǯ
in implementing economic and social policies. The UK ǯpolicy choice would be 
deemed contrary to Article 1 (P1-1) of the Convention only if it were found to be ǮǯǤ
the right to property. This interpretive choice de  ǯ  
respect to the totality of the specific grievances made by the applicants. Not only did the 
Court accept that Article 1 (P1-1) does not guarantee a right to full compensation in takings 
(at para 54), but it also held that a legislative expropriation programme designed for many Ǯ       ǯ ȋ   ? ?ȌǤ ǡ  
relying on a deep normative theory of the right to property to review the choices made by 
the UK legislature, the Court relaxed its standard of review and was satisfied that those     Ǯ       ǯ  
appreciatǯȋ ? ?ȌǤ126 
The James mantra has been repeated in virtually all cases that are to do with alleged 
breaches of the right to property in the implementation of the economic and social policy of 
States Parties. For instance, it was the approach that the Court recently took in Wieczorek v 
Poland.127 The case involved reviewing whether amending the legal framework pertaining 
to the right to receive a disability pension by reassessing the medical condition of 
                                                                    
126 The James approach has been recurrent in many cases relating to the regulation of the right to property; 
see eg Lithgow v UK (1986) 8 EHRR 329 at para 122 and Former King of Greece v Greece (2001) 33 EHRR 516 
at para 87. 
127 Wieczorek v Poland App no 18176/05 (ECtHR 8 December 2009). The Court had already taken a similar 
approach in Goudswaard-Van der Lans v Netherlands ECHR 2005-XI. 
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recipients was compatible with Article 1 (P1-1) of the Convention. After repeating the 
James formula (Wieczorek  ? ?ȌǡǮthe Court has accepted           Ǥǥ 
particular, the Court has noted the significance which the passage of time can have for the ǯ(at para 67). Similarly, in Stec and 
Others v UK128 the Court accorded the United Kingdom a wide MoA as regards the best way 
of taking into account differences between men and women in determining social security 
benefits for accidents at work. The Court followed a similar line of reasoning on alleged 
violations of the right to property after German reunification129 and in the context of 
review of austerity policies following EU/IMF bailout packages.130 In all of these cases, the 
Court has consistently held that the controlling test for considering whether a Convention 
right has been violated by a national authority will only be a relatively weak ǮǯǤ 
The underenforcement approach of the Court regarding issues of economic and 
social policy can be also tracked in other complex policy areas, in which correct decision-
making requires significant expertise. Consider, for example, the case of Markt Intern 
Verlag Gmbh and Klaus Beermann v Germany of 20 November 1989, which concerned 
balancing freedom of expression with fair competition considerations. The case was about 
an alleged breach of Article 10 of the Convention by German authorities enforcing 
sanctions under the Unfair Competition Act of 7 June 1909 on a publishing company that 
                                                                    
128 Stec and Others v UK ECHR 2006-VI. 
129 Jahn and Others v Germany ECHR 2005-VI. The Court has upheld this line in most cases to do with the ǮǯǤǡǡǯBerger-Krall and 
Others v Slovenia App No 14717/04 (12 June 2014); Zvolský and Zvolská v the Czech Republic, App 
No 46129/99 ECHR 2002-IX.  
130 Koufaki and ADEDY v Greece Apps no 57665/12 and 57657/12 (ECtHR 7 May 2013); Da Conceição Mateus 
and Santos Januário v Portugal Apps no 62235/12 and 57725/12 (ECtHR 8 October 2013) 
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had criticized certain undertakings and had sometimes called for commercial boycotts. The 
Court first summed up the different kinds of considerations to be taken into account when 
devising a workable scheme of fair competition policies in market economies, while at the 
same time guaranteeing freedom of expression. It went on to say: Ǯ   
legitimately contribute to the assessment of statements made in a commercial context, and 
it is primarily for the national courts to decide which statements are permissible and which  Ǥǯ131         Ǯthe European Court of Human 
Rights should not substitute its own evaluation for that of the national courts in the instant 
case, where those courts, on reasonable grounds, had considered the restrictions to be ǯȋ ? ?ȌǤ
made by national courts in balancing the complex factors involved in the determination of 
fair competition policies for commercial purposes if it could be shown that these were not ǮǯǤǡ
Court has taken a similar tack in matters of town and planning policies.132 Crucially, these 
are issues typically dealt with first and foremost by expert administrative agencies. 
A low-level institutional approach to MoA proposes a straightforward explanation to     ǯ  Ǥ     igh degree of technical 
complexity, it could plausibly be argued that the expertise, information-gathering and 
information-processing abilities of national legislatures, administrative agencies and even, 
under some circumstances, domestic courts, at least those specialized in particular types of 
litigation, are superior to those of the Court itself. In the absence of special conditions 
                                                                    
131 Markt Intern Verlag Gmbh and Klaus Beermann v Germany (1989) Series A no 165 at para 35. 
132 Gillow v UK (1986) 11 EHRR 355 at para 56. 
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warranting a greater degree of suspicion133 the Court has a powerful, if not compelling, 
reason to underenforce Convention rights and defer to the decisions of national 
institutions, which could be comparatively more reliable than those of the Court itself. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 ǯ  effective 
implementation of the Convention pulls in the direction of a special kind of supervision of 
the decisions made by national authorities. Underenforcement through MoA is a central 
component of that kind of supervision. Special institutional reasons constitute its 
normative basis. In the absence of a specification of the role of institutional considerations, 
MoA appears to be a doctrine leading to unacceptable forms of relativism or, worse, an 
abdication of judicial responsibility. Both of these alternatives are justifiably unattractive to 
friends of Convention rights. However, normative institutional reasons can justify MoA 
without leading to relativism and the abdication of judicial responsibility. Moreover, they 
make comparative institutional abilities relevant. Further specification of the ways 
institutional abilities impact on  ǯ outcomes necessitates the construction of 
sophisticated empirical theories comparing the abilities of the Court with those of a variety 
                                                                    
133 See, for example, Kjartan Ásmundsson v Iceland ECHR 2004-IX, a case relating to the loss of disability ǡǮ
small group of 54 disability pensioners (some 15% of the 336 persons mentioned above) whose pensions, 
unlike those of any other group, were discontinued altogether on 1 July 1997. The above-mentioned 	ǯ
fact that after 1 July 1997 the vast majority of the 689 disability pensioners continued to receive disability 
benefits at the same level as before the adoption of the new rules, whereas only a small minority of disability 
pensioners had to bear the most drastic measuǡǯȋ
para 43). The Court found unanimously that Article 1 (P1-1) had been violated. On the basis of the fact that 
only the pensions of a very small group were discontinued, the Court was suspicious of the justification 
provided by the respondent state and tightened its scrutiny accordingly. 
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of national authorities. When it comes to laying down the conditions under which 
underenforcement doctrines such as MoA could be justified, high-level normative and low-
level empirical theorizing go hand in hand. I submit, then, that it is high time we started   Ǯ ǯ  decision-making of the Court and of national authorities by 
resorting to low-level comparative institutional analysis. 
